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Jacqueline Fick 
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Johannesburg, South Africa 
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ABSTRACT 
In the paper the author proposes that effectively and efficiently addressing cyber 
crime requires a shift in paradigm.  For businesses and government departments 
alike the focus should be on prevention, rather than the prosecution of cyber 
criminals.  The Defence in Depth strategy poses a practical solution for achieving 
Information Assurance in today’s highly networked environments.  In a world 
where “absolute security” is an unachievable goal, the concept of Information 
Assurance poses significant benefits to securing one of an organization’s most 
valuable assets:  Information.  It will be argued that the approach of achieving 
Information Assurance within an organisation, coupled with the implementation 
of a Defence in Depth strategy can ensure that information is kept secure and 
readily available and provides a competitive advantage to those willing to invest 
and maintain such a strategy. 
Keywords: cyber crime, cyber law, defence in depth, layered defence, 
information assurance, information security, public private partnerships, risk 
management 
 
1. INTRODUCTION AND APPROACH 
The President in his State of the Nation address on 3 June 2009 specifically 
referred to an increased effort to combat cyber crime and identity theft. 
Cyber criminals in South Africa have increased their attacks in both the private 
and public sector, with the most prevalent (cyber) offence remaining that of 
identity theft.  However, it must be borne in mind that identity theft is in most 
cases a means to an end:  to assume someone’s identity to evade the police, to 
obtain credit on someone else’s credentials where the criminal is not able to do 
                                                 
1 A shorter version of this paper was first presented at the Lex Informatica conference held in 
Johannesburg, South Africa in July 2009. That paper was selected as a best paper by the 
conference with an extension of that paper to be considered for publication within the Journal 
of Digital Forensics, Security and Law. The original paper for that presentation was then first 
published in the October 2009 issue of De Rebus, the South African Attorneys' Journal. 
Copyright in the original article vests in the Law Society of South Africa (LSSA) and this 
extended version of the article is published here with the permission of the LSSA. 
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that on his/her own, to gain access to bank accounts, to launder money, etc. 
But at the heart of cyber crime in South Africa lies the true asset these criminals 
wish to obtain:  information.  Information has become the most important asset 
any business or government department has and it is this information that enables 
a criminal to assume another identity, to log into another’s bank account, to steal 
confidential information, to deny an organisation access to its critical information 
systems.  Yet we fail to protect it with the same vigour as we protect our money 
or property.   
Secondly, South African law enforcement has been hampered in effectively 
dealing with this breed of criminals, due to for example resource constraints and a 
lack of sufficient training.  We also have no accurate statistics to determine the 
true value of these crimes, nor the extent to which they have harmed our country. 
Dealing with cyber crime in South Africa calls for a shift in paradigm:  new 
investigative methodologies and techniques, an increase in effective public private 
partnerships, better sharing of business intelligence and information and most 
importantly, moving from a re-active to a pro-active approach to dealing with 
cyber crime.   
This paper aims to show that prevention is better than prosecution.  Devoting time 
and resources to implement strategies that make it difficult for criminals to 
perpetrate their crimes within organisations is more efficient and cost effective 
than trying to catch them after you had been the victim of a cyber attack.  And in 
the unlikely event that you do fall victim to cyber crime and you have the right 
strategy and systems in place, you would also have a disaster recovery plan in 
place that enables the organisation to effectively and efficiently deal with the 
consequences of an attack, an audit trail that can point your investigation in the 
right direction and evidentiary material available that could stand the scrutiny of a 
court.   
Catching and eventually prosecuting cyber criminals are difficult and costly, both 
in terms of money, time and resources.  For businesses and government alike the 
reputational damage attached to a cyber attack can also be costly. 
The author is of the opinion that implementing the five core principles of 
Information Assurance and the Defence in Depth strategy, poses significant 
benefits to the prevention of cyber crime within South African businesses, as well 
as in government.  It will be submitted that the approach of achieving Information 
Assurance within the organisation, coupled with the implementation of a Defence 
in Depth strategy can ensure that information is kept secure and provide a 
competitive advantage to those willing to invest in such a strategy. 
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2. INFORMATION ASSURANCE 
2.1 Definition 
Information Assurance is defined in Wikipedia as the practice of managing 
information-related risks.  More specifically, Information Assurance seeks to 
protect and defend information and information systems by ensuring 
confidentiality, integrity, authentication, availability and non-repudiation.  These 
goals are relevant whether the information is in storage, processing, or transit and 
whether threatened by malice or accident.  In other words, Information Assurance 
is the process of ensuring that the right users have access to the right information 
at the right time. 
According to the US Department of Defence Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Words, 2003 Information Assurance is defined as information 
operations that protect and defend information and information systems by 
ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non-
repudiation. This includes providing for restoration of information systems by 
incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities. 
Information Assurance is closely related to Information Security and the terms are 
sometimes used interchangeably.  However, its broader connotation also includes 
reliability and emphasises strategic risk management over tools and tactics.  In 
addition to defending against malicious hackers and code, Information Assurance 
includes other corporate governance issues such as privacy, compliance, audits, 
business continuity and disaster recovery.  Whilst Information Security draws 
primarily from computer science, Information Assurance is interdisciplinary and 
draws from multiple fields, including accounting, fraud examination, forensic 
science, management science, systems engineering, security engineering and 
criminology, in addition to computer science.   
Information Assurance can be viewed as an umbrella concept bringing together 
issues of information security and dependability.  It must always be borne in mind 
that “absolute security” is an unachievable goal.  What the concept of Information 
Assurance proposes is defined in its name:  it is providing organisations with an 
acceptable level of assurance that even when there are attempts to interfere with 
the security, availability and reliability of networks and systems, there will still be 
an acceptable level of functionality. 
 
2.2 Objective of Information Assurance 
The objective of Information Assurance is to minimise the risk that information 
systems and the information stored, transmitted and processed thereon is 
vulnerable to threats.  This implies that, if an attack does take place, the damage it 
might cause will be minimised.  It also provides for a method to recover from the 
attack as efficiently and effectively as possible. 
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Information Assurance requires an organisation to focus on its access controls 
(both physical and logical access controls), individual accountability to ensure 
that each user of the system can be identified and to provide for audit trails which 
can provide historical records when a system is compromised. 
 
2.3 Five Pillars of Information Assurance 
Information Security is based on what is known as the CIA triad, namely 
confidentiality, integrity and availability.  Information Assurance has an 
additional two principles namely authenticity and non-repudiation.  Together they 
form the so-called five pillars of Information Assurance. 
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Figure 1: The five pillars of Information Assurance 
The National Security Agency of the United States of America (NSA) 
recommends that the application of the five pillars of Information Assurance 
should be based on the Protect, Detect and React paradigm.  This means that in 
addition to incorporating protection mechanisms, organisations need to expect 
attacks and include attack detection tools and procedures that allow them to react 
to and recover from these attacks.  It further recommends the implementation of a 
Defence in Depth strategy to achieve Information Assurance. This strategy will be 
discussed in full below. 
Upon analysis of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act, No. 25 of 
2002 (ECT Act), it becomes clear that the five pillars of Information Assurance is 
entrenched in our legislation and that in most instances, a breach in any of these 
areas has been criminalised. 
2.3.1 Confidentiality 
Keeping information confidential implies that information must only be accessed, 
used, copied or disclosed by users who have been duly authorised to do so.  This 
would include for example where you allow someone to only view information 
and not copy it for them, but the person was not authorised to see the information 
in the first instance.   
In terms of section 85 of the ECT Act “access” includes the actions of a person 
who, after taking note of any data, becomes aware of the fact that he or she is not 
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authorised to access that data and still continues to access that data.  Section 86 of 
the ECT Act criminalises the unauthorised access to, interception of or 
interference with data.   
In terms of section 86(2), read with section 89(1) a person who intentionally 
accesses or intercepts data without the authority or permission to do so is guilty of 
an offence and is liable to a fine or imprisonment not exceeding twelve months. 
 
2.3.2 Integrity 
Data integrity also deals with authorisation and implies that data may not be 
created, altered or deleted without the proper authorisation.  A loss of integrity 
could occur when a computer is infected with a virus, or where someone gains 
unauthorised accesses to a server and deletes critical data files.  Data integrity is 
also important in cases where computer evidence is to be used in court. 
In terms of section 14(1) of the ECT Act, where the law requires that information 
is to be presented or retained in its original form that requirement is met by a data 
message if the integrity of the information from the time when it was first 
generated in its final form as a data message or otherwise has passed assessment 
and that information is capable of being displayed or produced to the person to 
whom it is to be presented. 
In terms of section 14(2) the integrity must be assessed by considering whether 
the information has remained complete and unaltered, except for the addition of 
any endorsement and any change which arises in the normal course of 
communication, storage and display, as well as in light of the purpose for which 
the information was generated and having regard to any other relevant 
circumstance. 
Section 17 stipulates that where a law requires a person to produce a document or 
information, that requirement is met if the person produces, by means of a data 
message, an electronic form of that document or information, and if considering 
all the relevant circumstances at the time that the data message was sent, the 
method of generating the electronic form of that document provided a reliable 
means of assuring the maintenance of the integrity of the information contained in 
that document, as well as that at the time the data message was sent, it was 
reasonable to expect that the information contained therein would be readily 
accessible so as to be usable for subsequent reference. Section 17(2) furthermore 
provides that the integrity of the information in a document is maintained if the 
information has remained complete and unaltered, except for the addition of any 
endorsement, or any immaterial change, which arises in the normal course of 
communication, storage or display. 
Section 86(2), read with section 89(1) of the ECT Act provides that a person who 
intentionally and without authority to do so, interferes with data in a way which 
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causes such data to be modified, destroyed or otherwise rendered ineffective, is 
guilty of an offence and is liable for a fine or imprisonment of up to twelve 
months. 
2.3.3 Authenticity 
In simple terms authenticity means that a user that logged on to a computer is in 
reality the person whose credentials (e.g. user name and password) was used, or 
that documents on a computer have not been altered or forged.   
 
The most common authentication breach in South Africa is where user id’s and 
passwords are stolen (identity theft) and used to load false transactions on a 
system.  One must always bear in mind that identity theft is not when someone 
steals your credit card number; it is when someone steals you (Campana, 2006). 
According to Scott Charney from Microsoft (Tung, 2008) much has been done in 
terms of defence in depth against malware or against phishing schemes, but more 
remains to be done.  For this to happen, better authentication is required so that 
users can make better decisions about what is running on their computers.  
Charney also noted that there has been a major shift by software vendors to tie 
software more tightly to hardware to solve the problem of authentication.  
According to him one needs operating systems that are bound to the hardware, so 
that if it is tampered with there is better chance of knowing about, detecting and 
remediating the problem. 
Chapter VI of the ECT Act provides for the authentication of service providers in 
South Africa where accreditation is defined as the recognition of an authentication 
product or service by the Accreditation Authority. Authentication products or 
services are defined as products or services designed to identify the holder of an 
electronic signature to other persons. 
In terms of section 86(3), read with section 89(1) a person who unlawfully 
produces, sells, offers to sell, procures for use, designs, adapts for use, distributes 
or possesses any device, including a computer program or a component, which is 
designed primarily to overcome security measures for the protection of data, or 
performs any of those acts with regard to a password, access code or any other 
similar kind of data with the intent to unlawfully utilise such item to contravene 
this section, is guilty of an offence and liable to a fine or imprisonment not 
exceeding twelve months. 
Section 86(4), read with section 89(2) furthermore provides that a person who 
utilises any device or computer program mentioned in subsection (3) in order to 
unlawfully overcome security measures designed to protect such data or access 
thereto, is guilty of an offence and liable to a fine or imprisonment not exceeding 
five years. 
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2.3.4 Availability 
Availability does not only mean that the information on a system must be readily 
available, but also that the systems needed to process the information and the 
security measures that protect the information are all functioning properly at the 
time the information is needed.  In simple terms the right information must be 
available to the right person at the right time. 
During a denial of service (DoS) attack, information is not readily available 
because the users cannot access the information on their computers.  Section 
86(5) of the ECT Act, read with section 89(2) provides that a person who 
commits any act with the intent to interfere with access to an information system 
so as to constitute a denial, including a partial denial of service to legitimate users 
is guilty of an offence and liable to a fine or imprisonment not exceeding five 
years. 
2.3.5 Non-repudiation 
Non-repudiation implies that parties to an electronic transaction are bound in 
terms of that transaction:  the one party cannot deny having received the 
information, nor can the other party deny sending it.   
In terms of section 25 of the ECT Act a data message is that of the originator if it 
was sent by the originator personally, or by a person who had the authority to 
send it on behalf of the originator, or if it was sent by an information system 
programmed by or on behalf of the originator to operate automatically, unless it is 
proved that the information system did not properly execute such programming. 
An acknowledgement of receipt of a data message is not necessary to give legal 
effect to the message, but in terms of section 26 of the ECT Act 
acknowledgement of receipt may be given by any communication by the 
addressee, whether automated or otherwise, or any conduct of the addressee, 
sufficient to indicate to the originator that the data message has been received. 
In terms of section 23 of the ECT Act a data message used in the conclusion or 
performance of an agreement must be regarded as having been sent by the 
originator when it enters an information system outside the control of the 
originator or, if the originator and addressee are in the same information system, 
when it is capable of being retrieved by the addressee.  It is also stated that a data 
message must be regarded as having been received by the addressee when the 
complete data message enters an information system designated or used for that 
purpose by the addressee and is capable of being retrieved and processed by the 
addressee, and must be regarded as having been sent from the originator's usual 
place of business or residence and as having been received at the addressee's usual 
place of business or residence. 
In electronic commerce digital signatures are commonly used to establish 
authenticity and non-repudiation.  Section 13 of the ECT Act stipulates that where 
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the signature of a person is required by law and such law does not specify the type 
of signature, that requirement in relation to a data message is met only if an 
advanced electronic signature is used. 
3. DEFENCE IN DEPTH STRATEGY 
3.1 Introduction 
Due to the rapid development of business, IT trends and technology, it has 
become increasingly important to maintain proper control of an organisations’ 
information.  It is now commonly recognised that information is one of (if not) 
the most valuable assets an organisation has.  This information pertains to various 
business processes and disciplines within a single organisation:  ranging from 
strategic management information to basic operational process information.   
Defence in Depth is a strategy that can be implemented to achieve Information 
Assurance in today’s highly networked environments.  According to the NSA it is 
a “best practices” strategy in that it relies on the intelligent application of 
techniques and technologies that exist today.  The strategy is based on balancing 
protection capability and cost, performance and operational considerations.   
In its report on Defence in Depth, the Trusted Information Sharing Network 
(TISN) defines Defence in Depth as the systematic security management of 
people, processes and technologies, in a holistic risk-management approach. 
The concept is based on military strategy which implements defences primarily to 
delay rather than prevent the advance of an attacker.  It is assumed that an attack 
will lose momentum over time, allowing for those being attacked to respond 
appropriately.   This strategy is particularly useful when dealing with Information 
Assurance as one can never rule out the possibility of an attack, but one can 
implement a strategy that effectively and efficiently guards against, monitors and 
reports on such attacks and, in the event that an attack does take place provides 
for a strategy to address the damage.   
According to the TISN (TISN, 2008) the Defence in Depth is far more than an IT 
concept, as it delivers: 
? effective risk-based decisions; 
? enhanced operational effectiveness; 
? reduced overall cost and risk; and  
? improved information security. 
Defence in Depth provides an approach to security that is integrated with the 
organisation’s business processes and enterprise-wide risk management 
capability. 
For an organisation to effectively protect its information and information systems 
against cyber attacks, it is necessary to determine who the enemy is, why they 
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would want to launch an attack against the organisation and how they would then 
attack the organisation.   
Threats to the confidentiality, integrity and availability of an organisation’s 
information assets can arise through its employees, business partners, external 
sources and technological innovation.  The potential cyber criminal might be a 
disgruntled employee that aims to commit corporate espionage or launch a denial 
of service attack, or it might be a cyber syndicate that wants to steal user id’s and 
passwords to gain access to your client’s bank accounts.  Threats can also relate to 
intentional and unintentional actions that can potentially harm information assets.  
Examples of these threats include the following (TISN, 2008): 
 
PEOPLE TRADING PARTNERS 
• Disgruntled employees 
• Financially troubled employees 
• Corporate espionage 
• Uneducated/uninformed users 
• Business partners with poor data security 
• Physical access to shared systems 
• Misunderstanding of allowed access 
• Competitive environment 
EXTERNAL THREATS TECHNOLOGICAL 
INNOVATION 
• Hackers 
• Organised crime 
• Changes in regulatory framework 
• Faster networks 
• More storage in smaller devices 
• Technological convergence 
• Increasingly mobile workforce 
 
3.2 Focus Areas of Defence in Depth Strategy 
An important principle of the Defence in Depth strategy is that achieving 
Information Assurance requires a balanced focus on four primary elements, 
namely People, Technology and Processes (or Operations) and Governance.  
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INFORMATION ASSURANCE
PEOPLE PROCESSES/OPERATIONSTECHNOLOGY
DEFENCE IN DEPTH STRATEGY
GOVERNANCE
 
Figure 2:  People, Processes, Technology and Governance 
 
Figure 2 outlines the basic principles of a Defence in Depth strategy.  The strategy 
is based on the concepts of technology, people and processes (or Operations), and 
governed in terms of a management framework. 
Furthermore, it is of paramount importance to determine what the organisations’ 
system priorities are.  In other words which systems are critical to business 
operations and are needed to ensure operational effectiveness and a competitive 
advantage? 
 
3.2.1 Technology 
Technology refers to solutions that organisations employ that enable them to 
achieve and sustain their business objectives.  Key focus areas for implementing a 
Defence in Depth strategy in terms of technology would include the management 
of network architecture, infrastructure management, application security and 
communications management. 
A wide range of products are available that provide for Information Assurance 
services and detecting intrusions.  It is, however, of paramount importance to 
ensure that the organisation’s procurement policy is aligned to the overall 
Defence in Depth strategy and that the right technology is procured in accordance 
with the achievement of overall business objectives.  An effective procurement 
policy and process must have regard to the organisation’s security policy, what 
level of security is needed for a particular application, if the particular product has 
been validated by a reputable third party, a risk analysis pertaining to the 
acquisition of the particular technology or product, issues of integration with 
current systems and processes, etc.   
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3.2.2 People 
Within the context of the Defence in Depth strategy People refers to the security 
roles and responsibilities for internal and external persons.  It is essential to 
define, maintain and enforce security roles and responsibilities for employees 
within the organisation, contractors or business partners that the organisation 
deals with, service providers that are used where functions are outsourced and 
service providers that supply products or services to the organisation.  
Another key focus area would be user awareness and ensuring that all relevant 
internal and external persons are fully aware of and conversant with their 
particular role and responsibility and the procedural and governance framework, 
as well as policies applicable to them. 
3.2.3 Processes (or Operations) 
Processes (or Operations) refer to the standardised actions which are used to 
ensure the organisation’s position on security is sustained.  What this means in 
terms of the Defence in Depth strategy is that organisations must define, maintain 
and enforce standardised actions/processes which are used to develop and sustain 
its position on security on a daily basis.   
Key focus areas for the implementation of the strategy would typically include 
identity and user-access management, incident response management, disaster 
recovery management and audit management. 
The NSA provides the following examples of activities that are traditionally 
categorised under this heading: 
? Maintaining a visible and up to date system security policy. 
? Certifying and accrediting changes to the Information Technology 
baseline.  These processes should provide the data to support risk 
management-based decisions.  It should also acknowledge that a “risk 
accepted by one is a risk shared by many” in an interconnected 
environment. 
? Managing the security posture of the Information Assurance 
technology (e.g. installing security patches and virus updates and 
maintaining access control lists). 
? Providing key management services and protecting the relevant 
infrastructure. 
? Performing system security assessments, e.g. vulnerability scanners to 
assess the continued “security readiness” of the organisation. 
? Monitoring and reacting to current threats. 
? Attack sensing, warning and response. 
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? Recovery and re-constitution. 
3.2.4 Governance 
Within the context of a Defence in Depth strategy, governance refers to the 
oversight and coordination of technology, people and processes that is provided in 
terms of a management framework.  Key focus areas for the implementation of 
the Defence in Depth strategy would include risk management, information 
security and policy and compliance management.  Achieving Information 
Assurance through a Defence in Depth strategy would traditionally begin with 
commitment from a senior management level (such as from the Chief Information 
Officer), based on a clear understanding of exactly what the threats are that the 
organisation is facing.  This is then followed up by integrating and aligning the 
understanding with the organisation’s overall strategy, aligning with and 
incorporating it into with the business objectives and goals, drafting and 
implementing appropriate policies and deriving suitable procedures from them.   
 
3.3 Core Principles of Defence in Depth Strategy 
The TISN (TISN, 2008) defines the core principles of a Defence in Depth strategy 
as follows: 
? Implementing measures according to business risks. 
? Using a layered approach which would mean that if a single control 
fails, it would not result in the whole system being compromised.  The 
concept of a layered approach or layered defence is discussed under 
paragraph 3.5. 
? Implementing controls in such a way that they would increase the 
effort needed to attack and breach the system. 
? Implementing personnel, procedural and technical controls. 
In order to successfully implement a Defence in Depth strategy management must 
include the core principles of this strategy in the organisation’s overall strategy, in 
their annual planning, as well as within their organisational structure.   
It is important that the Defence in Depth strategy should not only protect against 
attacks, but also enable organisations to detect attacks and effectively respond to 
it.  It must also be borne in mind that attacks can take place from multiple 
locations by people from both inside the organisation or by outsiders.  It would 
therefore be necessary to deploy controls at multiple locations to guard against all 
classes of attacks.   
A further important consideration is that, in case of an attack happening within an 
organisation, the audit trail must be of such a nature that it would assist the 
organisation in taking appropriate internal disciplinary steps or that they would be 
Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 4(4) 
 
63 
 
able to provide sound evidentiary material and assistance to law enforcement 
agencies where criminal proceedings are to be instituted. 
 
3.4 Implementing a Defence in Depth Strategy 
Implementing a Defence in Depth strategy requires a shift in paradigm.  
Organisations must move away from the notion that IT security and/or 
Information Assurance are stand-alone issues, to where these concepts become an 
integral part of business planning, overall strategy, governance and operations.   
If one were to explain in practical terms what the importance of achieving 
Information Assurance is, try to imagine any organisation functioning without IT 
systems and support and even more pertinently, how any organisation can sustain 
its proper functioning and competitive advantage without securing, preventing 
unauthorised access to and insuring availability and functionality of its critical 
information. 
According to the 2009 IDG Research Services Survey some companies are so 
enthusiastic about the potential of new web and mobile technologies that they 
deploy them without adequately securing critical processes and data.  
Implementing a Defence in Depth strategy requires co-ordinating and integrating 
knowledge of the overall strategy and goals of the organisation or department, the 
internal environment (including systems, personnel and information assets), and 
the internal and external threat environment. 
The TISN (TISN, 2008) have identified four reasons why it is necessary to 
implement a Defence in Depth strategy: 
? Expanding organisational boundaries:  Businesses today form close 
alliances with their business partners, customers and suppliers.  This 
results in hard-to-define external boundaries, for example where 
business partners form a consortium to deliver a product, it might be 
that they rely on the same infrastructure, IT systems, personnel, etc. to 
deliver the specific product.  There is a need to determine where the 
organisations’ boundaries lie and what it is that it aims to protect by 
implementing a Defence in Depth strategy.  
? Mobile workforce:  It has become increasingly important for 
employees to be able to access their company networks from a remote 
location.  Employees need to access their emails from home or have 
their mail delivered to a Blackberry device.  The close 
interconnectivity between controls and office networks enable viruses 
and worms to spread more easily to control systems (Lüders, 2006).   
? Decentralisation of services:  As the use of computers in the 
workplace increases, so does the provision of services and systems via 
the intra and extranets.  Previously it was only necessary to grant 
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access to a select few, but these services and systems now have to be 
provided to a broader set of users. 
? Increasing value of information:  As stated above, businesses have 
realised what the value of information is to maintaining and sustaining 
a competitive advantage.  Due to the value of information, it has 
become increasingly important to apply stringent security measures to 
guard against the loss, destruction, tampering and theft of a 
businesses’ information.  It is also important to ensure that the right 
person has the right access to the right information at the right time.   
The steps to implementing a Defence in Depth Strategy can be summarised as 
follows: 
? Analysis of internal and external environment:  The first step 
towards implementing a Defence in Depth strategy would be to 
analyse the internal and external environment in which an 
organisation operates:  what its strengths and weaknesses are, the 
threats the organisation faces, what systems, assets, technology and 
processes are being used?  It is also necessary to establish what the 
organisations’ overall strategy is, to determine if the Defence in Depth 
strategy is aligned to business objectives and goals and if there is a 
clear understanding of what the Defence in Depth strategy means for 
the organisation, as well as what it would entail to implement it. 
? Determining the risks:  The second step is to determine what risks 
the organisation faces (in terms of Information Assurance): based on 
the weaknesses, threats and vulnerabilities that have been identified it 
is necessary to firstly establish if the organisation is aware of the 
identified risks and if they understand the implications of such risks.  
The identification of risks and proposing of mitigating actions must 
always be done in light of the particular organisations’ risk appetite.   
? Implementation of Defence in Depth strategy:  Once all risk areas 
have been identified and mitigation plans proposed, it is necessary to 
implement the proposed controls in such a way that it ensures 
optimum functionality of systems, the integration of controls across 
the organisation, as well as compliance with the overall business 
strategy and risk management process. 
? Maintenance, monitoring and review:  Due to the fast changing 
environment of IT, it is necessary to continuously monitor and review 
the functioning of the strategy, to adapt it to any changes in threats the 
organisation might face, changes to business goals or objectives or 
changes to the regulatory environment. 
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3.5 Layered Defence Approach as part of Defence in Depth Strategy 
Modern trends place increasing demands on information security within an 
organisation:  users need remote access to the network, third parties have to 
access the organisation’s network to perform certain functions or access specific 
information and more users within the organisation now need access to resources 
that were previously granted to a select group of users.   
The most effective way to secure information within these parameters would be 
through implementing different layers of control as part of the Defence in Depth 
strategy (Murali et al., 2007).  Tippett (2004) warned that “perfection in 
information security is impossible” and that smart people should zero in on 
identifying and building layered security controls around the network, because 
layering meant that even if one control failed, another was almost certain to catch 
the problem. 
Webopedia defines a layered defence as multiple layers of protection.  A layered 
defence means having multiple barriers to prevent attack, infiltration or malware 
infestation.  These may include malware protection, possibly from multiple 
vendors, running at web and email gateways as well as on the desktop, firewalls at 
the network edge and on endpoints, intrusion detection, system intrusion detection 
systems and behavioural monitors, data leak prevention systems and a wealth of 
other possible defences, all operating in harmony to provide best-possible 
protection. 
Controls will generally include both technical and process control mechanisms.  
Figure 3 provides a graphical representation of the layers of control implemented 
around a business process or key piece of business information (TISN, 2008): 
Physical Security
OS Security
Network Security
Database Security
Application Security
User Security
INFORMATION
 
Figure 3:  Layered Controls 
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Within the context of a Defence in Depth strategy a layered defence would mean 
that an organisation deploys multiple defence mechanisms between the attacker 
and the target.  Each of the mechanisms must present its own unique obstacle to 
the attacker and must also include both protection and detection measures.   
In practical terms it must increase the difficulty of successfully penetrating the 
network and thereby reducing risk, but also at the same time increase the chances 
of detecting the intruder: 
? It must identify users of a system by means of passwords, user names, 
etc. 
? It must also be able to provide for mechanisms to effectively and 
efficiently recover from damage caused by an attack.   
? It must also be possible to correlate the results of information from 
various departments within a business and information from different 
controls, in an effort to increase business intelligence that can be used 
to identify and prevent future attacks and that can be shared within the 
market or with law enforcement agencies.   
 
Within a broader context the concept of layered defence can also refer to the 
combined efforts of the public and private sector to combat cyber crime.  The 
most powerful weapon available to fight cyber criminals is the very same asset 
they seek:  information.  Cyber criminals often rely on businesses, government 
and law enforcement not sharing any information or connecting random attacks to 
establish a modus operandi.  They are often able to strike at different businesses 
within a same industry within a relative short period of time, because businesses 
are reluctant to share information about attacks with their counterparts.  Although 
this is understandable seen in light of the fact that businesses might loose 
competitive advantage or market share, it is only the criminals that benefit from 
not sharing information about attacks.   
However, the more developed the methods of information sharing between 
industry members, and between business and law enforcement agencies are, the 
less the need for a situation where full public disclosure will be called for.   
 
3.6 Maintaining a Defence in Depth Strategy 
Maintaining a Defence in Depth strategy includes continuous monitoring and 
evaluation of the effectiveness of the implemented program.  This would include 
evaluation the strategy to determine alignment where there are changes to the 
organisations’ business objectives or the overall enterprise strategy, where there 
are changes in the security profile or specific breaches in security occur, where 
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there is an increase in particular security breach phenomena such as an increase in 
key loggers that are being detected throughout the industry, as well as when 
weaknesses or gaps that are identified within the current strategy. 
The TISN (TISN, 2008) also recommends the model outline in Figure 4 to 
analyse the combined effectiveness of individual protection layers – whether 
currently in place or proposed for implementation.  The effectiveness of these 
individual protection layers must then be considered within the context of the 
identified threat environment. 
 
Information 
Assets
Control & Monitoring
• Basic admin 
systems
• Monitoring systems 
(e.g. IDS)
• Logging and 
physical protection
Prevention
• IPS
• Anti-malware
• Staff vigilance
Mitigation
• Policies and 
procedures
• Staff 
awareness 
training
• Access 
controls and 
strict 
configurations
Response
• Incident response 
planning
• Business 
continuity/
disaster recovery 
planning
• Third party 
coordination 
processes
 
 
Figure 4:  Layers of control protecting an information asset (TISN, 2008) 
 
Practical guidelines for maintaining the strategy and improving on it where 
applicable can include the following: 
 
? Know and understand your organisation:  This includes an 
understanding of the external environment and the threats facing the 
organisation.  It also refers to a thorough understanding of the internal 
environment and the way the organisation operates – its employees, 
levels of staff morale, business partners of the organisation, service 
providers, etc. 
? Define security roles and responsibilities:  Although security should 
be everyone within an organisation’s concern, ownership of 
information security should be assigned to specific individuals, 
coupled with the necessary levels of authority and accountability.  To 
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assist with the process it is recommended that security roles and 
responsibilities be incorporated into job description and that 
performance in terms of these areas be measured accordingly. 
? Adopt appropriate policies and procedures:  Once the Defence in 
Depth strategy has been drafted, the necessary policies and procedures 
should be put in place to govern the proper use of IT within the 
organisation, thereby ensuring optimal security.  This would include 
updating policies and procedures as the need arises and to incorporate 
necessary changes in regulations, technology or operational 
requirements, as well as training and the creation of awareness with 
internal and external users.  It is also critical to develop and define an 
appropriate incident response procedure and that this procedure is 
communicated to all users.  
? Continuous auditing and assessment of process:  It is recommended 
that a process of continuous auditing be implemented to ensure that 
the strategy remains aligned to business objectives, adapts to changes 
in technology or identified threats, and to allow for the analysis of 
information that is gathered from the different implemented controls. 
? Stay up to date:  Maintain awareness of new developments in both 
technology and services.  Use a risk-based approach to determine 
when it would be necessary to upgrade or adapt current systems and 
processes to accommodate new developments. 
? Effective public private partnerships: The effective control of cyber 
crime requires more than just cooperation between public and private 
security agencies.  The role of the communications and IT industries 
in designing products that are resistant to crime and that facilitate 
detection and investigation is also of critical importance.  To 
effectively address cyber crime also calls for a less re-active and more 
pro-active approach to the prevention, detection, investigation and 
prosecution of these crimes.  Whilst it might be that only law 
enforcement can arrest criminals, service providers and private sector 
organisations can do much to investigate and prevent cyber crime 
(Forman, 2009).  Within the context of a Defence in Depth strategy, 
such partnerships can deliver valuable business intelligence to prevent 
further attacks or to be able to detect them within an information 
system. Criminal intelligence analysis needs to be integrated fully into 
business intelligence, risk assessment needs to incorporate criminal 
threats, and cyber security needs to be conceptualised as part of a 
broader security problem that cannot be understood or dealt with in 
strictly technical terms (Williams, 2009). 
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4. CONCLUSION 
In today’s world information is fast becoming the most valuable asset an 
organisation has.  Information underpins every strategy, system and business 
objective within an organisation and without ready and reliable access thereto, 
organisations cannot function on an optimal level.   
It is however, critical to preserve the integrity of information, to ensure that it is 
stored, transmitted and accessed securely and that any system designed to manage 
and secure information is reliable, aligned to business objectives and in 
accordance with the risk management approach of the organisation. 
 
Achieving Information Assurance in an organisation through the implementation 
of a Defence in Depth strategy poses significant benefits.  It also ensures that 
South African organisations are aligned to the regulatory provisions contained in 
the ECT Act. 
The shift in paradigm from a re-active to a pro-active approach and focusing on 
prevention rather than the prosecution of criminals that attack your system, poses 
benefits in terms of cost, time, resources and organisational reputation.  The shift 
in paradigm required also includes to the need for sharing business (and criminal) 
intelligence and forming effective public private partnerships, reporting on threats 
and attacks and balancing what is best for the organisation with what is best for 
the community as a whole.   
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